Stay In Your Lane

Recently, Macleans.ca published an article by Ken Hansen titled “Why Police Tactics, Not Weapons, Failed Against Justin Bourque.|" In the article Hansen is described as a defense analyst, retired at the rank of Commander in the Royal Canadian Navy as a Maritime Surface Warfare Officer. Mr. Hansen now works for himself, owner of Hansen Maritime Horizons, a company who provides consultancy for the civilian mariner industry including personnel and operational support. Mr Hansen’s comments have caused a wave of controversy throughout the professional law enforcement and even military community, many demanding that Mr. Hansen “Stay in your lane”. 

Cst. David Ross, 32, of Victoriaville, Quebec; Cst. Fabrice Georges Gevaudan, 45, of Boulogne-Billancourt, France; and Cst. Douglas James Larche, 40, of Saint John, New Brunswick were gunned down by Justin Bourque during an active shooter assault on 4 June 2014. Two other RCMP members, Cst. ÉricStéphane J. Dubois and Cst. Marie Darlene Goguen were injured during the assault. The Moncton shooting was the first time an active shooter specifically targeted law enforcement officers in Canada. The RCMP are currently fighting charges under Canada’s Labour Code that it failed to provide its officers with the necessary training and equipment, specifically C8 Carbinerifles, (the Canadian equivalent to the M4/AR-15 for our readers to the south) to deal with this type of threat. 

Mr. Hansen is well-articulated and clearly demonstrates his higher education. What he fails to demonstrate however, is his knowledge and understanding in law enforcement tactics as they relate to active shooter events. He draws on his own experience as a military naval officer using his knowledge of military doctrine and tactics and attempts to apply them to a civilian law enforcement setting. Let me put things in perspective for those who do not quite understand. The military is a broad sword, not a scalpel. Not just in its size and firepower but in the way they train, and the way they are employed. You cannot place a soldier in the role of a law enforcement officer, much like you cannot place a law enforcement officer in place of a soldier. The same goes for methodologies in tactics, policy and doctrine. This is one of the many reasons why western nations have laws against the employment of the military in law enforcement capacity, with the exception of aiding the civil power such as Oka, or the Montreal riots the military was employed but it was under the direction of civil law enforcement and not its own separate entity. 

My research into Mr.  Hansen’s pedigree, has been entirely open source however I have yet to find a reference that outlines his expertise in law enforcement, small arms, small team tactics, employment in a high threat environment, ground combat, response to active shooter threats, or police doctrine. This is the primary concern of the professional gun community, a mix of individuals who have actually been shot at, possess first-hand knowledge of what it means and feels like to have to engage in a gunfight, take another person’s life or experience the fear of losing their own. I, personally, do not know of many naval officers outside of the special operations community who have. I myself, thankfully, have never had to experience this outside of a controlled training environment, I do however know and have spoken regularly with both military and law enforcement personnel and therefore this article is developed through their experience. 

In a Military setting, weapons, numbers and tactics are essential to a successful operation, much like they are in police use of force encounters. However the mandate is much different. Police officers are sworn to protect and serve citizens; they are obligated by law to do so. In Canada, this is covered under the first three principles of the Canadian National Use of Force Framework published by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police in November, 2000. 

1. The primary responsibility of a peace officer is to preserve and protect life. 

2. The primary objective of any use of force is to ensure public safety

3. Police officer safety is essential to public safety. 

The first two points speak to themselves. A Police officer, before applying for the job, knows and understands the risk they will not come home at the end of the shift, much like a military member understands the risk that they may not come home at the end of a battle. Police mentality differs from the military in the sense that they do not always have the option of intelligence resources, strength in numbers, equipment or a “tactical withdrawal”. In an active shooter scenario the offender is “actively shooting” victims. Their objective is not one of personal gain, political agenda, or religious belief. While some of these maybe the cause of their motivation their objective is to kill as many people as they can, as quickly as they can. In Moncton a “tactical withdrawal” for police meant innocents being killed. This was and will never be an option. For police this one of those damned if you do damned if you don’t scenarios. 

Police almost never have the tactical advantage in terms of numbers with exception to pre-planned operations. In many circumstances police are generally outnumbered. Here in Halifax the city employs over 500 police officers for a population of over 300K citizens. New York, having the largest police forces in the world with over 30K police officers in a city of over 11M people. The difference is made up in equipment and training. Not just in the use of force, but in a variety of other areas including mental health awareness, verbal communication, and interacting with the public to name a few. Military membersdo not receive the depth of training that police officers do. 

Police officer safety is essential to public safety. In layman’s terms means a dead police officer is no good to anyone. However expecting a police officer, or even a soldier for that matter, to take down a shooter armed with a weapon whose caliber alone allows them to engage targets out to 500 yards, with weapons that possess a max “effective” range of 50 yards is simple insanity. 

"The RCMP training changed in a radical way when the IARD program was implemented. As you stated this tactical withdrawal was no longer an option for the new members that were taught this at the academy." - Former RCMP Officer, 27 years service

Mr Hansen in his article states:

Reports from the Moncton incident show that the constables were confused, and some became terrified when wounded. Meanwhile, Bourque was completely calm and an efficient killer. While the police were very familiar with their equipment and the former commissioner says they were reasonably trained, their states of mind were not up to the situation. It is likely they eventually felt it was hopeless because they could not react effectively against their assailant. A tactical withdrawal was apparently not an option. 

Law enforcement active shooter policy does not permit a tactical withdrawal during an active shooter event. An active shooter event is different from a hostage taking, or barricaded gunman. In fact, many policies authorize the first officer on scene to enter an active shooter scene by themselves. An American study published in March 2014, titled The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents by the Police Executive Research Forum compiled 84 active shooter incidents in the United States and provided statistical analysis, stated that in 75 incidents, a solo officer entered a scene to take direct action against the active shooter. 62% of the time the officer shoots the attacker, 13% of the time the officer otherwise subdues the attacker and the remaining 25%, the attacker shoots themselves. More importantly, 33% of solo entries resulted in the officer being shot. 

Combat is a unique animal, I use the term animal because I cannot think of a better descriptor. Combat is very unpredictable, as Mike Tyson once said “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face” based on the testimony from veterans of the various conflicts the western world has been involved in. Many seasoned soldiers will tell you that there is no amount of training that can prepare you for actual combat; much like many police officers will say the academy can only teach you so much the rest you learn on the street. Unlike our friends to the south Canadian law enforcement officers are not exposed to the quantity of deadly force incidents. Confusion is inevitable; the only response to limit confusion is communication and training to cope with the sympathetic nervous system’s response to stimulus. The Sympathetic Nervous System controls our Fight, Flight, Posture, Submit responses to a threat and are triggered by four events; Objective Threat Perception, Objective Fear Perception, Physical Exhaustion, and Startle response. 

“Despite the instinct to rush in and protect, holding back and sending in an aerial drone to get a better understanding of the threat would have been a better first response. In fact, drones for reconnaissance are probably the force’s most urgently needed technology, rather than carbines for fighting.”

Quite frankly I think Mr. Hansen has watched Act of Valor or played Call of Duty one too many times. This is beyond a ridiculous suggestion to responding to an active shooter event, and again outlines Mr. Hansen’s lack of knowledge and expertise in this area. As previously mentioned, active shooter events have but one option, stop the threat. There was absolutely zero intelligence on the shooter, his motivations or who his intended victims were; there was no way for the RCMP to know that he specifically intended to target them. By not having carbine rifles and only responding with pistols and shotguns the RCMP were outgunned in an outdoor environment. The effective range of the RCMP’s weapons was much lower than Bourque’s, compounded by the effects of SNS activation and survival stress which include a 70% reduction of the peripheral field of vision which includes the loss of night vision, loss of near vision, loss of ability to focus the eyes, loss of monocular vision and depth perception, the effectiveness of their weapons was even less.

Frankly, considering the RCMP’s position in this battle, and as horrible as it sounds, three officers down was probably the best outcome they could have hoped to achieve. Only their training, decisiveness and instincts prevented more officers from being killed. 

In Conclusion Maclean’s has a professional responsibility to ensure that the so-called “experts” they allow to write commentary are actual experts in the topics they are discussing. Mr. Hansen has done a serious disservice to the members of the RCMP and the law enforcement community as a whole. His expertise is in naval and maritime related matters and his opinions should remain focused on those areas. One doesn't bring a knife to a gunfight, and you don't fight rifles with pistols.

In short Mr. Hansen, Stay in your lane. 

Ref: 

• Why Police Tactics, Not Weapons, Failed Against Justin Bourque – Ken Hansen, Maclean’s Online. – July 2017
• Threat Patter Recognition – Use of Force Instructor Manual Jan 2017
• Canadian National Use of Force Framework  - Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Nov 2000
• Training at the Speed of Life – Kenneth R. Murray
• On Combat  - LCol. Dave Grossman (Ret.) US. Army
• The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents – Police Executive Research Forum March 2014